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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
Case No. 
16532 
ELOY PAUL LOPEZ, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
STATE11ENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant was tried and convicted of the crime 
of Murder in the Second Degree, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-203 (b) and (c) (1953), as amended, in the Third 
JudiciaL District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State 
cf C~ah, the Honorable Bryant H. Croft, Judge, presiding. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The trial court entered a judgment of guilty of 
Murder in the Second C'egree, and subsequently committed the 
appellant to the Utah State Prison for the term provided by 
law, five years to life. 
RELIEF SOUGHT 0!' J:..PPEAL 
Respondent seeks affi~.ation of the judgment of 
c;uil t::· as rendered by the lovier court. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On November 10, 1977, appellant went to the Drift 
Inn Bar in Lark, Utah, where he drank a few beers and some 
liquor (R.264,270,292,350,489). Approximately 20 to 30 
minutes later, Lynn Oliver arrived at the bar (R. 491), and 
engaged appellant in conversation (R.494). Eventually, they 
discussed a fight appellant had been involved in two weeks 
earlier (R.496). An argument ensued which evolved into a 
fight (R.289-290,321,356,496-499). They wrestled around, 
threw punches at each other, and each ended up on top of 
the other at one time cr another (R.290-291,500). They 
were then thrown out the back door by the bartender (R.266, 
499-501). 
The fight continued outside, several observers 
peering periodically through the back window of the bar 
(R.293,312,324,338,358). One of the observers, Kim Horrocks, 
went outside to the parking lot when the fight was ongoing 
(R. 360,379,381). She i:nmediately observed the victim, 
Lynn Oliver, falling (H.361,38l-382), but was distracted 
momentarily by a hio:sing noise (R.36l). Upon returning 
her attention to the ~ight, she observed Oliver lying on the 
ground (R.36l), and then watcned appellant walk over to 
Oliver and kick him in the head (R.363,383). Appellant 
then stepped back and again kicked Oliver in the head 
-2-
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(R.364,368). l'.ppellantwaswearing work boots equipped with 
a steel toe at the time he kicked the victim (R.392-393,487,515). 
The victim went into convulsions. Blood was coming out 
of the front of his head and he was gasping for air (R.297-
298). Appellant then began to administer mouth-to-mouth 
resuscitation (R.297). The victim was then taken inside 
the bar to await arrival of the paramedics. 
When the paramedics arrived, Oliver was comatose 
and was having a difficult time breathing (R.402). He 
was transported to a hospital where he was treated for 
brain damage by Dr. John Sanders (R.279-286,46l-469). The 
treatment was unsuccessful. The victim had ceased to 
breathe on his own and was thus placed on a respirator 
(R. 282). Two EEG's were performed to evaluate brain 
activity (R. 283,462). T~e results showed no brain activity, 
a~d that the viet~" was neurologically dead (R.458-460, 
~62-465). Subsequently, the life support machines were 
turned off and the patient expired (R.464-465). 
Testi~ony at trial revealed that although 
several people viewed many stages of the fight, Kim 
Sorrocks was the only person who viewed Oliver getting 
~icKed in tje head (R.29~-297,326,330,339-340,3590366,367-380). 
S~e further testified that appellant had told her prior to 
t.:lt:: flcht t:-Jat ne v,;as ' 1 loo~:ing for troublen (R.352-353) .. During 
-3-
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the course of the fight, Ms. Horricks heard Oliver tell 
appellant that he did not want to fight, but just wanted 
to be friends (R.357,378). Ms. Horrocks also stated 
that it was the appellant who was "pressing" the fight 
the entire time and that he grabbed the victim by the 
shirt and dragged him out the back door to finish the 
fight (R.378,379). Once outside in the back parking 
lot, the victim appeared to be the one always retreating 
(R. 359,379). 
Several witnesses testified regarding the 
appellant's mood and condition prior to the fight as 
well as the victim's physical condition following the 
fight. Anthony Vasquez stated that appellant and the 
victim were drinking but not drunk prior to the fight, 
although appellant seened to have a "slight buzz" on (R.334). 
He also stated that following the fight he observed a cut 
which looked like a little hole on the right side of the 
victim's head (R.328) 2s well as "little holes" on the 
fore side of his head (R.340). Candido Abeytc; testified 
that he observed scratches on the victim's face following 
the fight (R.299). Ms. Horrocks stated that the appellant, 
prior to the fight, was on his way to being drunk and 
did not appear to be in a good mood (R.385,372). 
-4-
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Officer Curtis Nielsen of the Salt Lake County 
Sheriff's Office testified that when he arrived on the 
scene the victim's face was quite bloody (R.389). He 
also stated that he found no dents or blood stains on 
an automobile located near the fight (R.39l). 
The para~edics testified that upon their arrival 
at the Drift Inn Bar, they observed the victim in a 
comatose condition (R.402), having a difficult time 
breathing (R.402), and having sustained a number of 
abrasions and contusions to the face and head (R.408). 
There v,·as also blood and dust on the victim's face 
(R. 415). Fenton Quinn, the paramedic who initially 
treated the victim, testified that he observed an 
indentation, which looked to him like a footpri~t or 
tip o~ a boot, in the right side of the victim's head 
(?. -±03-LlO~). He also stated that he told another 
;ara~edic t~at it looked to hi~ as though the victim 
~ad been kicked (R.404). It Kas brought out on 
redlrec~ exa~1nation of Mr. Quinn that these observations 
~:· him (Quinn) were made prior to his hc.ving been informed 
~~at ~~e victin had indeed been kicked in t~e head (R.410). 
~ treat~~g ph~·sician, Dr. John Sande=s, testified 
::-:.c.t ~.2.s o!Jservation o: t:-1e \l'ict.i::. revealeC. certain 
~~~~~c~c~istics \{~:ch deno~ed severe inju~~- to the victim's 
-5-
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brain stem (R.279). This damage was responsible for the 
failure of the victim to breathe property, since the 
respiration center is located in the brain stem (R. 282-
2 83). The failure of the brain stem and its components 
to function properly was caused by undue and increased 
pressure, bruising, or a combination of both (R.282-283). 
Dr. Sanders also stated that the victim had sustained a 
basal skull fracture (R.280). This was diagnosed due to 
the presence of blood coming out of the victim's left ear 
(R. 280). It was his supposition that the victim had 
sustained head tra~~a, which in turn was responsible for the 
victim's neurological status (R.280). 
Dr. Hebertson, a neurologist who specializes in 
reading EEGs, testified tha~ he read two EEGs performed on 
the victim and it \\as his synopsis that there was no evidence 
of "on-going cerebral electrical cortical activity, i.e., 
the higher ca~ters of the brain were not producing nor 
reflecting any signs of electrical activity (R.458). This 
information was given to Dr. Sanders, who stated at trial 
that it was his medical opinion that the victim's brain 
wad dead and that the patient had no chance for a 
neurological recovery (R.458,463). The victim was then 
taken off the respirator due to the fact that he demonstrat~ 
no spontaneous brain f~nctions and nothing could be done 
to repair those fc:y-,ctions (?. 464-465). 
-6-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Deputy State Medical Examiner, Terry H. Rich, 
testified that he was the pathologist who performed the 
autopsy on the victim (R.419-420), that he observed 
multiple abrasions on the head and face of the victim 
(R.421), and observed two fractures of the skull and 
a significant subdural hemorrhage underneath the skull 
between the bone on top of the brain tissue (R.424-426). 
He also observed areas of contusion of the skull along the 
frontal lobes and temporal lobes along the base (R.426 1 • 
The autopsy also revealed that there was extensive hemorrhage 
on the brain stem, which would have caused cessation of the 
respiratory and heart centers, causing death (R.426). Dr. 
Rich traced the cause of death to the trauma which caused the 
fractures of the skull, and stated that the trauma which 
caused the skull to fracture also caused a swelling of the 
brain. This swelling, coupled with subdural hemorrhage, 
causeci pressure inside of the cr=.nial vault which causes a 
p1nching down of the spinal cord and midbrain ponds. The 
brain stern area could also have been pushed down to the 
spinal canal, causing a lack of oxygen and a secondary 
:-.er:torrhage. This lack of oxygen t~en caused a cessation of 
the l:::_fe function (R. :,27). 
Dr. Rich further stated that the force or trauma 
~:jich c2used t~e ~rac~ure5 came fro~ two separate directions 
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(R.427-428), and that the nature of the injuries and the 
forces causing them were consistent with the victim 
having been kicked twice by a boot; once from the left 
side of his head, and once on his forehead (R.427-429). 
At trial, the appellant admitted he became 
involved in an argument with Oliver concerning a fight 
appellant had had two weeks earlier with a Don Waltz 
(R.496). He admitted a fight ensued with Oliver, but 
claimed he could not remember many of the details of the 
argument or fi9ht due to alleged intoxication (R.496). 
However, he denied ever kicking Oliver in the head (R.519). 
When asked whet~e~ or not he saw Lhe victim's head hit 
anything as he was falling during the fight, appellant 
responded, "I don't know what he hit" (R.523). He did 
ac'.rnit wearing safety boots .:i th a steel toe on the night 
in question (R.515). 
On direct examination, appellant was questioned 
by his counsel about the fight which he had been involved 
in two weeks prior to l'ovember lC, l977 (R.492,496). On 
cross-ex~~ination, the appellant described some of the 
detd.ils of that fight (E. 516-519). He stated that Donny 
Waltz fell to the ground. When asked if he had any 
recollection of having kicked \·;al tz in t:1e head on that 
occasion, appellant responded necatively (R.5l8-519). 
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The prosecution on rebuttal offered the testimony 
of Janice Ortega, a bartender at the Drift Inn Bar (R.553). 
She testified that the day after the Oliver fight she went 
to the hospital to check on the victim. Upon returning, she 
stopped at the Drift Inn Bar. The appellant was present 
(R. 554). She informed Merle Watson that "they didn't think 
that Lynn [Oliver] was going to make it" (R.555). At that 
time the appellant responded, "Well, what if he does? All 
I'm going to get is a year in jail for manslaughter'' (R. 555). 
Ms. Ortega was also questioned about appellant's 
earlier fight with Donny Waltz. She testified that on that 
night she was tending bar, witnessed the fight, and 
saw appellant kick Donny Waltz in the head (R.SSS-557), 
hppellant's counsel then pursued more details of the fight 
on cross-examination (R.558-564). 
Finally, Merle Watson, also a bartender at the 
Jrift Inn (R.260), testified that three or four days following 
the fatal incident, he heard appellant "bragging about 
kill inc; a man (victim) with his ovm hands" (R. 268). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
~HE TRIAL COURT DID l-<OT COMMIT ERROR IN 
;..J!HTTING EVIDEt\'CE OF ACTS OTHER THAN THE 
OC:E FOR lmiCH APPELLA-1\JT \"lAS TRIED. 
~he appellant testified in his own behalf that 
-9-
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of the fight betweeD the two men, and that the fight arose 
out of an argument over a previous fight that had occurred 
two weeks earlier between the appellant and another 
individual named "Donny" (R. 492). Some of the details 
of the earlier fight were brought out on direct examination 
by appellant's counsel: 
Q. Had you met Donny before? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Where had you met him? 
A. In the Drift Inn about maybe 
two weeks before that. 
Q. Under what circumstances did you 
meet Donny on that occasion? 
A. Well, I walked into the bar with 
my brother of mine and a friend of 
mine named Dan, and apparently it was 
Dan's girlfriend. I was standing there 
and he pulled a knife out on me. I 
said, "\'/hat are you doing that for? 
I don't even know you." And then that 
is when Lynn [victim of the case at bar] 
took the knife away from him. 
Q. After Lynn took the knife away from 
him, then what happened? 
A. I walked over by the pool tables of the 
Drift Inn and he \.Janted to fight. So we h;: 
a iight at the Drift Inn, Donny anc I. bu~ 
that was over right away. Ana Lynn took 
him home and '>'>'e left. (R. 4 9 2). 
On cross-examination, the prosecutor sought to 
develop the details of the earlier fight: 
Q. Mr. Yengich [counsel for appellant] has. 
talked to \"OU about a fiqht vou had witn 
one Donnv l\laltz. I believe ~·ou said you 
didn't k;m\,' Donnv verv well but vou haC bee· 
in a fight a couple of weeks bef~re this 
even at the ~rift In~? 
A. Yes, Slr. 
c. 1"/!m vias then= ·,;hen you had t:-,a t fight 
v:i th hlr-.? 
brother Lo·c:is. I -.... ::..n~: Roy Ort~gc. v:a.s 
-l 
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Q. 
Q. 
Q. 
A. 
Q . 
• '1.. 
Q. 
Q. 
h.. 
Q. 
Q. 
Q. 
? .. 
Q. 
]-_. 
Q. 
r, 
"" A. 
Q. 
Q. 
Q. 
A:1y other person? 
::..yr:n Oliver was there. Dan lvadsworth 
was t~ere from West Jordan, and that 
is all I can recall. 
Had you been drinking that night? 
Yes. 
Do you remember what you were drinking? 
Yes. 
l·ihat? 
Beer. 
Very much? 
l~o. 
Your claim was that Donny pulled a knife 
on you? 
Yes, sir. 
And Lynn took the knife away fror:-. !".i::c? 
Yes, sir. 
\·lould you describe for me ac;ai:-.. ,·:-.a:: 
kind of a fight you had ,,-i th :~im c.:"::er ::he 
k::1ife [-,ad been taken av.-ay fro:n him? 
_:..._ fist fight. 
Describe it for me. Kind of a blow-for-blow? 
It was only--not even maybe three or four 
blov.·s. 
v;ho hit v.·horn? 
Pc.rdon? 
Did you hit him? 
Yes, sir. 
Ho\\' many times? 
Once. 
Did he hit you? 
Yes. 
:lo..,...- mar-1 v times? 
I don't.know. Maybe once or twice. I tried 
to hit him still. I hit the steel pole and 
b~oke ny hand. 
Did either one of you ever go to the ground? 
Yes. 
Did either one of you fall to the ground? 
Yes. 
·,.;:-.ich c:~e? 
Do:-cn:,· C.id. 
1\-:-"a.t C.i.C ::z·ou do? 
l·;hc.:: did I do \·:'len he wc.s on the ground? 
Just let him get up. 
Do ~ou have any recollection of having 
}:~c~e~ ~i~ in the head? 
-11-
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A. No, sir. 
Mr. Yengich: I object and ask that be 
stricken. I ask that we move for a 
mistrial. Counsel has asked a question 
like that and there is no good faith 
repetition. 
The Court: The answer is no and the answer 
may remain, and the motion is denied. 
Q. (By Mr. VanDam): Your testimony is 
you did not kick him at all; is that what 
I heard? 
A. Yes. 
Mr. Yengich: The question was asked and 
answered. 
The Court: Cross-examination. 
The Witness: Yes. 
Q. (By Mr. VanDam): You did not kick him? 
A. I did not kick him. 
Q. Or attempt to kick him? 
A. No, sir. (R. 516-519). 
In rebuttal, the prosecution called Janice Ortega, 
a bartender at the Drift Inn, who testified over 
appellant's objection, ~hat on the earlier occasion of the 
fight between appellant and "Donny" she had observed the 
appellant kick "Donny" while he lay on the ground: 
Q. On that date, did you have occasion 
to see a man by the name of Donny 
\~al tz? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you see a man named Eloy Lopez? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What ~e~e you doing that night? 
A. I was working that night. 
Q. Did you see a fight that night in the 
bar? 
i:... Yes. 
Q. Will you describe that fight, please? 
M~. Yengich: Objec~ion to any description 
of the fight as not relevant to the 
issue before the Court. Ke are talking 
abou~ an alterca~ion on the lOth of 
~\ O'"Jer.lbe r. 
~!1E 2ourt: ~~ll, ~~ic~ ~ig~~~ a~e ~·ou 
~aL~:ing about:· 
-1.2- + 
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fight which Mr. Lopez said he did not 
use his fist. That is the one. 
The Court: We will let her answer some 
questions concerning the fight that 
she can testify to that was about two 
weeks before. 
Mr. Yengich: Your Honor, we will object 
to their characterization of the fight. 
He knows the date; we would suggest to 
the Court that characterization was only 
meant to inflame the jury, and it was 
improper, and ask the jury to be admonished 
about that. 
The Court: I don't think his question was 
improper or intended to do an:;'th:'_,,q of the 
kind. It has been describe~, ~he people, 
the two men had a fight a couple oi: v:eeks 
before. That is what he is asking her. 
Q. (By Mr. Marson): Can you describe that 
right, Janice? 
A. I didn't see what happened to start it. I 
was at the other end of the bar. 
Q. Describe it from the point you saw it. What 
did you see? 
A. I seen Donny fall down and I did see Eloy 
[appellant] kick him. Donny ha~ his arms 
up around his head. 
Hr. Yengich: Object. It is onlv prejudicial. 
It is in violation of Rule 45 of Utah 
rules of evidence. There is no necessity 
of proving something like this for any 
issue under the rules of evidence in the 
State of Utah. We would object and ask 
it be stricken. There is no purpose for 
any iss-ue under the rules of evidence in the 
State of Utah. We would object and ask it 
be stricken. There is no purpose for it. 
The Court: The motion to strike is denied. 
Q. (By ML 'larson): You saw him kick him? 
A. Yes. 
The Court: That is what she testified to. 
Q. (E~' Hr. '1arso;c): \\-hat did you see? 
I seen Donny laying down and Eloy was 
kicking him. (R.555-557). 
-13-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Appellant claims in his brief that the prosecutor 
introduced "evidence of another criminal act in order to 
discredit the appellant generally as well as to impeach 
appellant's testimony that he did not kick Lynn Oliver on thE 
occasion of which the instant charge arose" (Appellant's 
Brief, pp. 5-6, 8-9). He further alleges that "the purpose 
of introducing the details of the incident was to mislead 
the jury to the conclusion that appellant was an evil or bad 
person, one who is quarrelsome and likely to resort to dead!;' 
weapons witho;Jt justification" (Appellant's Brief, p. 13) 
(emphasis added). 
Appellant argues that receipt of evidence regardinc 
the earlier fight was a violation of Rules 55 and 47 of the 
Utah Rules of Evidence, and that the trial court abused its 
discretion in failing to exclude such evidence, thereby 
violating Rule 45, U.R.E. 
Respondent submits that cross-examination and reb,:: 
evidence regarding the prior fight was proper and justi£iabl: 
received by the trial court pursuant to the following theoriE 
SAID EVIDE!,C:S \'il-5 hiTHIJ\i THE 
RU~ES AKD SCO?E OF PROPER CROSS-
Ex;.J,:Il\ATIOF. 
Evidence of the earlier fight was initially 
introduced on direct exa~inatio~ appell2.nt's counsel 
(R. 492). 
-14-
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On cross-examination counsel for the State merely 
pursued the details of the fight such as "who hit who," 
what kind of a fight was involved (R.516-519), and whether 
appellant kicked Waltz in the head during the fight (R.518-
519). 
The rules of cross-examination are clearly set 
forth in this state. Utah Code Ann. § 77-44-5 (1953), as 
amended, states in relevant part: 
If a defendant offers himself as 
a witness, he may be cross-examined by 
the counsel for the state the same as any 
other witness. 
The Section of the former Code (Section 5015, Comp. Laws 
1907) verbatim in relevant part to Section 77-44-5 was 
commented upon by this Court in State v. Vance, 38 Utah l, 
110 Pac. 434 (1910): 
section 5015 in express terms 
provides that the accused, if he becomes a 
witness, must be treated on cross-examination 
the same as any other witness. In view of 
the provisions of these sections, the test 
t!-Je court must keep in mind is: 1·/ould the 
particular question be proper cross-examination 
if the same were propouncied to any other 
witness who had testified to the same facts 
that the accused has testified to? If the 
question would be proper cross-exa:nination 
if asked of c.rw other 1,·itness it would likewise 
be if propounci~ci to one on trial for a criminal 
offense, or ¥ice versa. The rule is that as to 
whether the accused has mc.de certain admissions, 
or has made statements of material facts against 
himselt and everything which may contradict, 
-15-
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modify, explain, or make clearer, limit or 
enlarge the meaning of the statements 
made by him while testifying with respect 
to any subject of which he has testified, 
may be inquired into on cross-examination. 
The inquiry must, however, be limited to the 
subject-matter gone into by the witness in 
his testimony in chief. . Where the accused, 
as a witness, denies that he committed or was 
connected with the com~ission of the criminal 
act or acts constituting the ofLense for which 
he is being tried, the cross-examination 
ordinarily must be permitted to extend to the 
whole range of facts which in some way are 
related to the transaction constituting the 
offense. 
110 P.2d at 445 (emphasis added). 
Several later cases have reaffirmed this principle 
holding that areas which an accused opens up for questioni~ 
on direct examination are subject to further inquiry on 
cross-examination. State v. Schieving, 535 P.2d 1232 (Utah 
1975); State v. Studham, 572 P.2d 700 (Utah 1977). In the 
Schieving case, the defendant wcs found guilty of mishandling 
of public ~onies. At trial, evidence of shortages of ~oney 
within defendant's department other than those for which 
he was standing tricl were acl.rrit.ted by the trial court over 
defendant's objection. On appeal, his conviction ~as affirm~ 
and his claim of error regarding cdmission of such evidence 
was dismissed: 
In this ccse evidence of cnother shortage 
\vithin the defendcnt's department was not 
prejudic~al, and this is especiallv true in 
view of the fact that defendant testified as 
to the o~~er shortagE, and it was his 
testimo~,. t~~t -~~ro~~r~~ the subject i~~o 
Lne trlc.l. 
535 P. 2d at 1233 (emJ::;hasico added). 
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In Studham, the defendant was convicted of rape. 
One of his grounds of appeal alleged error in allowing 
cross-examination on a court order prohibiting the 
defendant from visiting the prosecutrix. In affirming 
the conviction, this Court stated: 
To the defendant's claim of error in 
allowing cross-examination on a court order 
prohibiting defendant from visiting the 
prosecutrix, the state makes two effective 
rejoinders: First, that the subject was 
opened up by defendant's own counsel on 
direct examination and thus could nrooerl" 
be probed on cross-examination. Seccnd, L~at 
the testimony v;as relevant to inquire abo1..:c:. 
the background and relationship between the 
parties, relied upon by the defendant 
himself as bearing upon the critical issue, 
of whether there was consent, or forcible 
rape. 
572 P.2d at 703 (emphasis added). 
In State v. ~lora, 558 P. 2ci 1335 (Utah 1977), 
this Court upheld allowing t~e prosecution on cross-
~::er.ses, v.-:--,ere the de::=endant chose on direct examination 
~o show through his testimony that he was not a man of 
On direct cxa~ination defendant was asked 
not only whether or not he had been convicted of a felony 
~c~ the date and t~·pe of felony. He was also asked 
-.~,ctr1er or not 2 v.·ecpon v:cs usee ln the comrc.ission thereof. 
-17-
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direct examination testimony that he was not a man of 
violence. The Court upheld such a line of cross-
examination: 
Inasmuch as the defendant had chosen 
to elicit evidence to show that he was not 
a man of violence, that matter became a 
legitimate subject of inquiry and 
refutation. Wherefore, the questions 
asked by the prosecutor seem reasonably 
calculated to bring out facts which 
might tend to contradict or weaken the 
effect of the defendant's assertion. 
558 P.2d at 1336. 
Ea~lie~ in its opinion, the Court stated the 
applicable rule of law as it now stands in Utah: 
When a defendant offers himself as a 
witness, he may properly be subjected to the 
tests of credibility, by questioning him in the 
same manner and to the same extent as any other 
witness, as to any matter which would tend to 
contradict, weaken, or modify the effect of 
his direct examination. 
558 P.2~ at 1336. 
The record in the present case clearly indicates 
that appellant, throuqh his counsel, opened up the issue 
on eli rect examination regarding the fight betv1een himself 
and Donny Waltz (R.492). The subsequent questions 
propounded on cross-exa~inatio~ by counsel for the 
state regarding details o~ the fight, including whet~er 
or not during the fis;:-:t appella:1t Licked Dor:ny \':al tz 
in the head, were well within the boundaries of proper 
cross-examination. The ~uestions asked b~· the prosecutor 
were directly relatec tc t~,e lssue c: t!1e flc "t bro __jur;ht j 
-lt-
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out on direct examination. 
Finally, it is a long-standing rule of this Court 
that matters of cross-examination and the extent thereof 
rest largely within the discretion of the trial judge. 
This Court will reverse only if an abuse of that discretion 
is shown. State v. Starks, 581 P.2d 1015 (Utah 1978); 
State v. Curtis, 542 P.2d 744 (Utah 1975); State v. 
Anderson, 27 Utah 2d 276, 495 P.2d 804 (1972). Eve"l if 
an error .is made in limiting or extending the bou...'1ds 
of cross-examination, it is not to be reversed unless it is 
also shown to be prejudicial. State v. Starks, surpa; State 
v. Maestas, 564 P. 2d 1386 (Utah 1977). 
Respondent submits that the cross-examination was 
?roper as it related to the subject matter introduced on 
oirect examination. Furthermore, no abuse of discretion 
o~ the part of the trial judge has been shown. 
B 
SAID EVIDENCE iiJ..S J..D~liSSIBLE TO 
PROVE A ~Q.TERIAL FACT PU?.SUANT TO 
~ULE 55 OF THE UTAH RULES OF 
L:VIDENCE. 
Rules 55 of the Utah Rules of Evidence states: 
Subject to Rule 47 evidence that a 
person con.P1i tteo a crine or civil hTong on 
a S?eci~ieC occ~sion, is inaG~issijle to 
prove hls disposition to co~"it crime or 
ci\·il ~:r~~g as ~he ~~sis for a~ inference 
t~~.at :-~.t:_: corn..:.i ~ted ano-ther crime or civil 
-19-
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wrong on another specified occasion but, 
subject to Rules 45 and 48 such evidence 
is admissible when relevant to orove some 
other material fact including absence of 
mistake or accident, motive, opportunity, 
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge or 
identity." (Emphasis added.) 
Appellant asserts that admission of evidence of 
specific details of the fight between appellant and Don 
Waltz particularly testimony relating to the appellant 
kicking Watz in the head, is violative of Rule 55, as it 
did not fall within any of the exceptions mentioned and 
was introduced to nc~ only inflame the jury, but to show 
that appellant had a propensity to commit this type of 
crime. 
Respondent submits that such evidence was 
admissible to prove (l) a material fact other than those 
mentioned in the exceptions under Rule 55; (2) modus 
operandi. 
Case law ln Utah clearly states that generally 
speaking, evidence of other crimes is not admissitle 
if its sole purpose is to disgrace the defendant as a 
person of evil chc.racter \·,'i th a propensity to commit 
crime and thus likely to have committed the crime chargee. 
State v. Johnson, 25 Utah 2d 160, 478 P.2d 491 (1970). 
There are numerous cases, however, which have made 
-20-
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exception to that general rule. Such exception has been 
made based upon one of the exceptions listed in Rule 55 
or at times based upon other reasons relevant to the 
issue being tried. State v. Daniels, 584 P.2d 880 (Utah 
1978) (evidence relevant to explain the circumstances 
surrounding the instant crime is admissible for that 
purpose, though it tends to connect defendant with 
another crime); State v. Brown, 577 P.2d 135 (Utah 1978) 
(evidence of commission of other crimes admissible to 
prove knowledge, intent, and modus operandi); State -,-. 
Cauble, 563 P.2d 775 (Utah 1977) (evidence of other crimes 
adraitted to show intent); State v. Underwood, 25 Utah 2d 234, 
479 P. 2d 794 (1971) (evidence of commission of other 
crimes is relevant where it is an integral part of competent, 
relevant evidence of the crime charged); see also State v. 
E2ran, 25 Utah 2d 16, 474 P. 2d 728 (1970); and State v. 
Scott, 175 P.2d 1016 (Utah 1947). 
Respondent submits that evidence of details of 
t~e earlier fight, adduced on cross-examination and rebuttal 
testimony, were relevant to prove a "material fact" under 
?.l2~e 55. J..i=pellant had denied kicking the victim, Lynn 
('live~, in t~e case at bar. The crux of the State's case 
re~ard1ng tje second degree murder charge revolved around 
t~e issue as to wjether ai=pellant kicked the victim in the 
-21-
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witnessed appellant kick the deceased twice in the head 
with his steel-toe boot (R.363-364,368,383,392-393,487, 
515). Appellant denied ever having kicked the deceased, 
though he could offer no explanation as to how the victim 
got in the state he was in (comatose) following the fight. 
Thus, the issue was whether the victim was kicked in the 
head by the appellant. In other words, was appellant 
lying or ~as the eyewitness, Kim Horrocks, lying. Such 
a determination was crucial to the outcome and disposition 
of the case. }illy relevant testimony which would tend to 
help the jury decide this material fact would be helpful. 
When appellant on direct examination introduced 
the issue of the earlier £ight it then became relevant 
on cross-examination to ascertain whether appellant's modus 
operandi in that particular fight was to kick his opponent 
in the hec.d. When he denied hc.~ing kicked Waltz in the 
head, the prosecution then presented an eyewitness (Janis 
Ortega) on rebuttal exarr,ination who testified that she did 
in fact ~itness the appellant kick Waltz in the head 
(R.556-557). The issue then becomes two fold: ( l) ·.c l~ 
appellant would lie about kicking so~eone in the head in 
one fight (assuming c:he state's v,·it:Jesses "'ere believed 
-22-
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. l by the JUry), would he not lie about kicking the deceased 
in the head in the case at bar. Such a determination is 
of course, as previously mentioned, crucial to a resolution 
of the charge of second degree murder in this case; (2) 
is it the modus operandi of the appellant to kick with his 
feet when involved in fights? 
Certainly evidence of kicking in the prior fight 
is admissible as an exception to prove modus opera:cdi ·_:~,-:~r 
Rule 55. State v. Brown, 577 P.2d at 136. In BrO\,u, tne 
defendant was convicted of theft and selling a motor vehicle 
with altered vehicle identification. Rebuttal evidence of 
a prior, unrelated offense involving theft and sale of a 
stolen auto and an attempt to conceal those crimes by 
replacing parts of t~e stolen automobile bearing vehicle 
ide:; t if ica tion mlinber s with parts fror:J a v:recked auto 
purchased by defendant, was admitted as being relevant to 
show similar facts revealing modus operandi. 
1 (a) ~hat this Court views the evidence and all reasonable 
inferences v.'"~~ch ::1ay be drav.-n therefrom in the light most 
favorable to the jc:ry's verdict, see State v. Helm, 563 
P.2d 794 (Cteh 1977); State v. Jones, 554 P.2d 1321 (Utah 
1976); State\'. Sinclair, lS Utah 2d 162, 389 P.2d 465 (1964). 
(b) As to tne es c:rnpt~on thet the jury believed those aspects 
of the evid~~ce ~ ich su2~ort their verdict and survey the 
eccrd o~ appeal ~ t~at-ii~~~, see State v. Harless, 23 
tah 2d 128, ..,59 .2d ::'10 (l969); St=.te v. Hov1ard, 544 P.2d 
66 (L'tah 1915). 
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Returning to the argument regarding the admissibility 
of the kicking incident on rebuttal in order to prove a 
"material fact" under Rule 55, 2 respondent calls the attention 
of the Court to recent case law involving similar factual 
contexts. 
In State v. Green, 578 P.2d 512 (Utah 1978), 
defendant was convicted of selling narcotic drugs. He 
denied that he had seen the undercover agent who allegedly 
purchased drugs from him on the date charged. On cross-
examination the defendant stated that he had not seen the 
undercover agent since August 2 (the crime for which he was 
tried occurred August 3). On rebuttal, over defendant's 
objection, the undercover agent described a sale made to 
her by defendant on August 2. She also testified that the 
defendant had often sold her drugs in the past. The 
conviction ~as upheld and the prior sale was ruled to 
have been properly admltted: 
. if evidence serves some 
legitimate purpose as to proof of the 
crime, or in bearing on the credibility of 
evidence, the fact that it may show the 
corrunission of another crime will not render 
it admissible. 
2 See Note at end of Rule 55, Rules of Evidence - As Adopte~­
by the Supreme Court o::' Utah, v:hich states: "The generaL; 
accepted rule prohibits e\·idence of another cri!.\e or Clvll 
v.Trong as proof that a person co!~-:' . .::.t-ceC a crir:~e or civil 
wrong on a specified occasion. T:>e thi:ws sc': forth~-' 
[absence of ni tc.Le or ccciCe:-:t, :-'.::t- '.'e,- o~~-crtuni ~y, ~ 
preparation, p 2..:1, ·~:~o,·.lt_:c:ige, or lGt:::--,~.:.._:_,,-1- c.r~ 
and not exclus \Te. H (:.,n~_:;Jasi.:::-. c.Cded. 
-24-
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Although it is true that one accused 
of crime is clothed with a number of 
protections; including . . the right not 
to give evidence against himself, if he 
chooses to waive the latter right, and 
offers himself as a witness, he then 
becomes subject to being treated the same 
way as any other witness. This includes 
cross-examination on any matter which would 
tend to contradict, explain or cast doubt 
upon the credibility of his testimony. 
Furthermore, any testimony or evidence 
which is purposed to those same objectives 
may be introduced in rebuttal. 
In analyzing the defendant's contention 
of error in the light of those rules, it will 
be seen that the testimonv of Ms. Gierez 
[undercover policewoman], of which the defencant 
complains, was in legitimate refutation of his 
statements wherein he denied ever having sold 
drugs, or of having seen her after August lst, 
and his statement that he had not left his home 
from the evening of August 2 until after August 
3. 
578 P.2d at 514 (emphasis added). 
Tl-Je a.nalogy bet,,•een the Green case and the case 
at bar is readily apparent, i.e., that in the present case 
~~e defe~dant denied having kicked Waltz in the head. 3 
This was rebutted by the state's witness who said she saw 
the appellant kick 1·:altz. Suchv;as that factual case in 
Green, except tr,e denial there involved selling drugs on a 
crior occasion as well as being in the presence or seeing 
~ I~ beth the Green case as well as in the case at bar, 
che defendantc-aPoellants denied complicity (or relevant 
facts r garding ihe co~plicity, i.e., kicking people 
in the ead durinc fichts) in the crimes for which they 
-.. ere be r.g triecc ~s v.·~ll as prior crimes or bad acts. 
-25-
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the undercover agent on aE occasion other than the one fo:r ·,1;,1 
the defendant was on trial. In both cases, of course, the 
determination as to who to believe was for the jury. 
In State v. Jarrell, 608 P.2d 218 (Utah 1980), 
defendant was convicted of attempted criminal homicide. On 
direct examination, he was asked questions concerning his 
"quasi-military" activities in Southeast Asia for purposes 
of showing his physical powers, and, thus, that the "inept" 
assault on the victim was committed by someone other than 
the defendant. O:c cross-examination, the State was permittee 
to question the ci<efe,~ldant regarding his involvement in quasi-
military activities in Africa, specifically, if he had tak~ 
part in a kidnapping and if he had killed people while 
in Africa. This was objected to by defendant, but overrul~ 
by the trial court. The Utah Supreme Court upheld the 
conviction, sustaining the ruling of the trial judge: 
5~cad discretion is allowed in cross-
examination of a defendant who has opened 
up an area of direct examination. 
608 P.2d at 228. 
Thus, evidence of the kicking of Kaltz on cross-
examination ·~·:c.s aclr:1issible unCer t~e r11ling in State v. 
Jarrell, supra; anC the r-uling .:.n St2te v~ Green, suprc, 
enables evidence of the kicking broucht out on rebuttal 
to be adDissible. Such evidence ~:as not o~fered, as 
submits, for t!:.e purpose c: ''2t~c:---,;,~_ins; to s!-JO'v. th2t 
haci a propensit~ :cr "\·iolc:-.t. cr~:--,i:--u~.} c:cts,'' DU~ v:c..~ I 
I 
-2 ·~-
.... 
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to prove a material fact under Rule 55, that fact being 
whether appellant was lying when he denied kicking the 
victim of this case in the head. The second fact to 
be proved was modus operandi, whether or not this was 
the method (kicking) appellant used when engaging in 
fights. 
Appellant claims that the evidence of the 
kicking on the prior occasion was inflammatory. Assuming, 
arguendo, that the evidence was inflammatory, this wou~d 
~ot render it inadmissible due to the fact that it was 
relevant and competent. State v. Danker, 599 P.2d 518 
(Gtah 1979). The reason for such a~~issibility was stated 
in Dc.C~ker: 
The reason . is that the jury is 
entitled to know the truth of the situation 
in order to c.rrive at a just verdict; and 
notwithstc.nding the prerogative of the court 
to exclude evidence, he should onl~ do so if 
he thinks it will cause the processes of 
justice to go awry. 
599 P.2d at 519-520. 
Furthermore, the evidence was admi~ted in proper 
:alrness to the State. The a~pellant absolutely denied 
·:;c:-:i:-,:; c.nyone, be it the deceasec': \·icti:r. or l·ialt.z. It 
;~'cuJd be Danifes~l}· u~f~ir to allo~ the appellant to 
c~~i~ ~o~-co~plic~t~· es a defense without allowing the 
State to present a\-2llable e\ricie~ce to the contrary . Such 
..::: / 
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reasoning, which respondent submits should be followed in 
the present case, was very adequately stated in State v. 
Hansen, 588 P. 2d 164, 167 (Utah 1978): 
It is within the prerogative of the 
legislature to enact rules of evidence; 
and it is the duty of the courts to give 
them effect. If that is to be done in 
this case, the State should not be 
permitted to proceed in its case in 
which to introduce evidence of past 
offenses or misconduct of the defendant. 
However, that is the extent of the 
proper application of that statute. It 
[Rule 55] cannot be invoked to thwart 
the processes of justice by preventing 
the cresentation of anv competent evidence 
to rn~e~ any material issue ~aised in the 
case. The prosecution (i.e., the public it 
represents) is also entitled to fairness and 
justice. 
It would be mani:::estly unfair to permit 
the defendant to raise [an] issue . . , then 
prevent the prosecution from presenting any 
available evidence to the contrary. 
Consequently, when it becomes apparent from 
the evidence that the defendant is relying 
upon [a] defense. . , the carrving out of 
the fund2Dentc.l ?·Jr?ose of the tr::.al, thc.t 
of ascertaining tne truth, makes lt both 
lo~lcal and necessary that the Stc.te be 
allo·"'ed -co !Jresent any evidence in impeachrnc!lt 
or rebuttal which would show the defendant's 
d::.scosi~ion to cc~wit the crime charqed. This 
is in accordc~ce ~it~ ~~e law as correct!~, 
stated ln Rule ~5, [U.R.E.]; and the fact that 
this mc.y include prior acts o::: crime or 
misconduct would not render such evidence 
inadmissitle. (~~phcsis added.) 
cross-examinatio:-~ and rebu::tc.l regarclng appellant J.:ickinc; I I 
Waltz in the head during t~'1eir flc;ht has properly admitted I 
:-cle :,~, :.::s ·v.:ell a:::, to pro\·e to prove c. ;..::-.Cer 
modus operandi ~urs~ant ~G ~h~ 
-2(: 
I 
I 
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Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
c 
SAID EVIDENCE WAS PROPER TO 
IMPEACH APPELLANT'S TESTIMONY 
REGARDING A RELEVANT AND MATERIAL 
FACT. 
Respondent submits that evidence of the kicking 
of Don Waltz by appellant was properly admitted for 
purposes of impeaching appellant's testimony regarding a 
relevant and material fact. 
As discussed in Point I-B, supra, a materia~ :Get 
was whether or not appellant kicked the deceased Vlctim 
of the present case in the head. Crucial to that determina-
tion was whether the jury believed appellant, who denied 
the kicking, or whether they believed Kim Horrocks, who 
witnessed the fight and testified that she did in fact 
witness the appellant kick the victim--twice. Evidence 
of a prior fight in which appellant was also involved was 
broug~~ out on direct examination of the appellant. Prior 
inquiry by the prosecutor on cross-examination regarding 
cetails of the fight led to a question of whether appellant 
used ~'1e sarne modus operandi in the l'laltz fight as he 
allegedly used in the fatal fight with Lynn Oliver. Once 
again denying such a ~odus operandi, appellant's credibility 
re?arding ~~ether he d1d in fact use his feet in the Waltz 
ficht became an important issue in this respect: if 
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regarding the same issue for which he is standing trial? To 
attack the denial by appellant regarding the Waltz incident, 
a rebuttal eyewitness was presented by the State not to show 
that appellant had a propensity to commit crimes by kicking 
people in the head (although as shown supra in Point I-B, 
such evidence was admissible to show modus operandi), but 
to show that he (appellant) was lying regarding such a modus 
operandi in the Waltz case, ~ fortiori, the jury could now 
decide whether or not he was lying in the present case 
regarding the same modus operandi. 
This Coc.rt has ruled that cross-examination affecting 
the accuracy or credibility of a witness's (defendant or 
otherwise) testimony is admissible even though it may shOII' 
commission of another crime. State v. Green, suDra, at 578 
P.2d 513-519; State v. Mason, 530 P.2d 795, 797 (Utah 1975). 
The question is whether rebuttal evidence is 
admissible for t~e purpose of attacking the appellant's 
credibility. ':':'his Court a:1swered that question af£irmativel:· 
in State v. 1•\itchell, 571 P. 2d 1351 (Utah 1977). In that case, 
the defendant was convicted of aggravated robbery. The 
prosecution's evide:1ce showed that the defendant a~d his 
companion, armec 11·ith guns, ch2rged into a home, terrorized 
the occupants and took cas'J from the victim, Barbara Harrio-
The defense presented evidence that no weapo:1s were used, 
no cash taken, and that what actcally occurred was two 
dissatisfied custo::1ers (ce:;:ee1dar_t and COD[:•cnion) stole a 
-3 [1-
I 
I 
I 
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bag of narcotics (heroin). On the witness stand, the victim 
Barbara Harris testified that the defendant carried a gun 
when he entered the premises. The defendant vigorously 
denied this. Harris also testified on cross-examination 
by defendant's counsel that she had never lied under oath 
and that she had not lied at the preliminary hearing, where 
she denied she had ever sold heroin (defendant had claimed 
she sold him a "bad bag'' of heroin on the date in question, 
thus precipitating his theft of another bag). Defense 
counsel called Darryle Riddle as a rebuttal witness, who 
testified that he had worked as an undercover policeman during 
September and November of 1975 and that part of his duties 
included undercover narcotics purchases. Upon stating that 
he knew the prosecution's witness, Ms. Harris, the prosecution 
re~uested to voir dire the witness outside the presence of the 
jury. 
The prosecution determined that on June 20, 1975, the 
day o~ the crime for which defendant was now being tried, 
Riddle was not engaged by the police. A proffer of Riddle's 
testimony was offered by defense counsel for the record, viz., 
~e (Riddle) would testify that he had purchased heroin from 
~s. Harris at her residence on September 29 and October 2 
and 3 of 1975. 
Defense counsel asserted that he was entitled to 
1~pcach her s~2te~ents ~nat she had never sold heroin, pointing 
~ ~=.~~ hi~ dc~ense wa~ based upon the claim that no robbery 
-31-
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occurred, but there was a theft of heroin. The prosecution 
witness insisted there was no heroin. Defense counsel 
therefore urged that in order to receive a fair trial, 
defendant was entitled to present evidence that Ms. Harris 
had, in fact, lied. 
On appeal, the State relied upon the rule that 
answers of a witness upon cross-examination on any irrelevant 
or collateral matter are conclusive and binding, and the 
witness may not be contradicted or impeached upon an 
immaterial or collateral matter of issue. 
The Utah Supreme Court in its opinion spoke to the 
issue regarding whether or not something is a collateral 
matter or issue, stating that "facts v,rhich would be independent: 
probable are not collateral." Wlthin this category the Court 
placed facts "which are relevant to the issues" and "facts 
independently provable to impeach or disqualify a witness, 
whether or not introduced to contradict him. " The Court 
also elaborated on a third type of fact, declaring that it 
should have been ad.:ni tted as evidence: 
Finallv, a third kind of fact must be 
co:-',sidered.- Suppose a \.-i tness has told a story 
of a transaction crucial to the controversy. 
To prove him wrong in some trivial detail of 
ti.-ne, place, or circumstance is "collateral." 
But to prove untrue so~e facts recited bv the 
wi~ness that if he were reallv there and-saw 
what he claims to have seen, ~e could not have 
been mistaken about, is a convincinq kind of 
impeac~ .. e~t ~ta~ t~e coLrts must Ga~e place for, 
al t.'lough -che contracic-c ion e\·ic:icnce lS otherv.·ise 
inc.d::-lissible because it .::._s ccllc.~.crc_l c.::.Oer the 
tests ~en~ioned aoovP. ?o dlsp~o\-e ~uc~ a fact 
-32- 1 
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bnr 
is to pull out the linchpin of the story. 
So we may recognize this third type of allowable 
contradiction, namely, the contradiction of any 
part of the v1i tness' s account of the background 
and circumstances of a material transaction, 
which as a matter of human experience he would 
not have been mistaken about if his story were true. 
The profferred testimony of witness Riddle was 
not impeachment of witness, Harris, on a collateral 
issue. There were two versions as to what occurred at 
the Harris' residence. According to the prosecution 
two armed robbers charged into the home, terrorized 
the occupants, and took cash from victims Harris and 
Bradley. Narcotics were not present or involved. 
According to the defense, no weapons were i~~c:ved, 
no cash was taken, two dissatisfied customer:= stole 
a bag of narcotics as a culmination of an argument 
over the quality of the goods purchased. Whether 
Harris, in fact, distributed narcotics from her 
residence was, indeed, a relevant issue in the 
case, which defendant was entitled to prove for 
a purpose independent of impeaching Harris' testimony; 
thus, it was not a collateral issue. 
571 P. 2d at 1355 (emphasis added). 
Respondent submits that the rebuttal evidence 
in the case at bar was precisely the type of facts and evidence 
1~ich the Court referred to in Mitchell. The facts are practically 
identical, excepting the tyoes of felonies involved. In the 
present case the question as to whether appellant kicked another 
person in the head during a fight other than the one on which 
~e is standing trial would normally be a collateral matter. 
Sue~ is not the c2se, ha~ever. Appellant denied kicking the 
deceased victim of the crime for which he is on trial. A 
1tness (Kim Horrocks) was offered prior to such denial testifying 
Appellant voluntary brings up on direct 
e:-:2~i~a~ion ~~1e £2ct ~}~Et ~e ]~ad been involved in another fight 
In cross-examination 
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he denies having kicked that person in the head during the 
fight. Certainly such a denial by appellant under the rule 
in Mitchell, can be impeached on rebuttal by one who was 
present on that occasion and saw otherwise. To rule contrary 
would be, as stated supra, in State v. Hansen, to "thwart 
the process of justice by preventing the presentation of 
any competent evidence to meet any material issue raised. 
The material issue being, in the present case, whether 
appellant lied when he denied kicking the victim and/or Don 
Waltz, when there were eyewitnesses on both occasions who 
testified otherwise. 
Respondent thus submits that the rebuttal and 
cross-examination evidence was properly received in evidence 
for the purpose of attacking appellant's credibility concerni~ 
a material issue, 4 that issue being whether appellant kicked 
an individual (Oliver or Waltz) in the head and whether his 
denial of such was credible. 
D 
SAID EVIDENCE \'i'AS PROPERLY RECEIVED 
BECAUSE ITS PROBATIVE \'ALUE \~AS NOT 
SUBSTF.!\TV"LLY OUT\'JEIGHED BY ANY DANGER 
OF Ul\'DCE PP,EJUDICE TO THI: i\PPELLANT. 
Pursuant to Rule 45, U.R.E., a trial judge " 
may in his discretion exclude evidence if he finds that 
4 See also Utah Code _:__nn. § 78-2.;-l (l()':d), as a;ceTJded, VJinc:_l 
reads in relevant part: iTl ever~· case the ~· 
of the \•:i tness may- be C.::::-c_v;n i :-1 cue.stio:-1 . ~- co::.tra.c:c-:> 
evidence; and the ur~· are t~E e)clusiv~ j~d~e~ o~ tis 
credibility." 
-34-
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its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk 
that its admission will . (b) create substantial danger 
of undue prejudice or of confusing the issues or of misleading 
the jury. (Emphasis added.) 
Respondent has heretofore explained the probative 
effect of adgitting evidence of appellant kicking Don Waltz. 
That probative effect must be balanced against any possible 
prejudicial effect on appellant. Such prejudicial 
effects could include showing a propensity for 
appellant to conunit a certain type of crime, infla..'":-~'":lation of 
the jury, or misleading a jury to a conclusion that appellant 
was an evil or bad person. Such a balancing process 
:ce'"ardi:Jg evidence must be done by the trial judge, Rule 45, 
C.".E., and his deternunation thereon should not be disturbed 
~~ ~~is Court on appeal unless there is a showing of clear 
atuse of that ciiscretion. State v. Gibson, 565 P.2d 783, 
186-787 (Utah 1977); State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d 1338; rehearing 
den:'..ed; State\' . .;:_ndrev7s, 576 P.2d 857 (Utah 1977). 
Respondent sub~i~s that not only has appellant 
£ailed to show a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the 
~ri~l ~udge rega:cdi:Jg the evidence in question, but has also 
~a:'..~ed to s~cw a:J~ substantial danger of undue prejudice 
~e~~ir~C ~nder Pule ~5. ~or has he shown that any such 
all"'gcod prej;_;dicr= ·,:CJuld sul:lstantially out1-1eigh the already 
:Ce~.~: . .c:cratcod ;-.rc:;:::c.ti\·e ._-a~c.:e. The:cefore, this Court should 
-35-
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT Pi'<OPERLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY 
ON THE LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF ~~NSLAUGHTER. 
Appellant alleges that the trial court improperly 
refused to grant his tendered instruction on manslaughter as 
a lesser included offense under three alternative theories 
(R.90). 5 The trial court did submit an instruction on the 
lesser included offense of manslaughter on alternative theory 
A pursuant to Section 76-5-205(a), but refused to submit 
alternative theories B and C of manslaughter, as proposed 
by appellant. 
The State alleged the following alternative theories 
of Second Degree ~1urder pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(t 
and (c) (1953), as amended, v.•hich were submitted to the jury: 
5 Appellant's theories ~ere offered pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-205 (1953), as amended. The alternative 
theories were that appellant caused the death of Lynn 
Oliver under one of the following circumstances: 
A. That the appellant recklessly caused 
the death of Lynn Oliver. 
B. That the appellant caused the death of Lvnn 
Oliver under the influence of extreme me~tal 
or emotional disturbance for which there is 
no reasonable explanation or excuse; or 
C. That the appellant caused the ceath of 
Lyn!1 01 i ver u!1der c irclffils tc.nce s -,;here 
c.ppellant reasonablv believed the circum-
stances :_Jrovided a ffio~al or legal jc.sti::icatiCT"l 
or extenuation for his conduct althouqh the 
conduct is not legally justifiable or- excusable 
under the existing circcmstances. 
-36-
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... 
or 
(b) intending to cause serious 
bodily injury to Lynn Oliver, he [appellant] 
committed an act clearly dangerous to human 
life that caused the death of Lynn Oliver 
(c) acting under circumstances 
evidencing a depraved indifference to human 
life, he recklessly engaged in conduct 
which created a great risk of death to 
Lynn Oliver and thereby caused the death 
of Lynn Oliver. 
Appellant's argument centers around the contention 
c~at all of his theories of the case regarding manslaughtsr 
should have been submitted to the jury for their co~siieraclon. 
Respondent contends that the instruction on nan-
slaughter given by the trial court was proper as well as 
sufficient, and the only justifiable instruction which could 
~a~e been give~ based upon the evidence adduced at trial 
~~~-:-__:;e), c.:-1C. ~:Jet there \;as ins·J.::Eicien.t evider.ce on which 
~a s~t~~t a?pella~t's Band C theories on Manslaugher to 
Appella~t cites several cases in support of his 
Resoonde~t submits, respectfully, that the law 
i~ ~oto ~as not ~roperly been stated by appellant regarding the 
~·.-_l_SE.~:ce ~ecessc.r~· fer su!J:-:-iss:.c~. of lesser included instruc-
~~c~~ 2~d ~heories in Utah. 
~his Court tas enu~erated many times the long-
sta:'.:-'i.:cc; ru.'.e of :Cav,· rec;c.rciing ooc:b~issio'' of instructions of 
-.~'~ --.c , ... c~ a c~s~, i~cludi~g submission of lesser 
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Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
... when parties so request, they are 
entitled to instructions on their theory of the 
case, including the submission of lesser included 
offenses. However, this is true only where there 
is some reasonable basis in the evidence to 
justify the giving of such instructions. 
State v. McCarthy, 25 Utah 2d 425, 483 P. 2d 890, 891 (1971) 
(emphasis added). See also State v. Close, 28 Utah 2d 144, 
499 P. 2d 287, 288 (1972) (evidence must show some reasonable 
basis on which to base defendant's instructions); State v. 
Gillian, 23 Utah 2d 372, 463 P. 2d 811, 812 (1970) (defendant 
entitled to have his theory of case submitted if any 
reasonable view of evidence would support such a verdict 
thereon); State v. Johnson, 112 Utah 130, 185 P.2d 738 
(1947) (defendant entitled to have jury instructed on his 
theory if there is any substantial evidence to justify giving 
such an instruction thereon). 
Though the law is clear that one standing accused 
of a criminal charge is entitled to have his theory of the 
case presented to the jury via instructions, such is not an 
absolute right and will only be enforced where there is a 
certain quantllic of evidence available on which to base such 
instructions: 
It is a basic legal premise that a 
defendant in a criminal case is entitled to 
have his theory of the case presented to the 
jury. However, the right is not absolute, 
and a defense theory must be supported by a 
certain quantum cf evidence before an instruction 
as to an included offense need be g1ven. 
State v. Hendricks, 596 P.2d 633, 634 (Lltah lS'/9). See 
See also State v. HO\·,·ard, 597 P. 2d 8/S, 880 (l'ta;-; 1979). 
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The "certain quntum of evidence" referred to by 
this Court in Hendricks seems to be one of a "reasonable doubt" 
standard. State v. Dock, 585 P.2d 56 (Utah 1978); State v. 
Castillo, 23 Utah 2d 70, 457 P.2d 618 (1969). In both Dock and 
Castillo, the defense offered theories of self-defense and 
requested instructions thereon. In both cases the trial court 
refused to instruct the jury on the defendant's theories. In 
Dock the only testimony offered was that of defendant himself 
when he declared that "he was afraid" and thus actec acccr'iliE?lY 
by attacking a prison guard. In Castillo, the Cour~ described 
defendant's theory of self-defense as "all theory and no evidence, 
all shadow and no substance." The Court elaborated on the 
standard to be used when evaluating a defense request for 
instruction on a defense theory: 
If the defendant's evidence, although 
in material conflict ~ith the State's proof, 
be such that the jury may entertain a 
reasonable doubt as to ~hether or not he 
acted in self-defense, he is entitled to 
have the jury instructed fully and clearly 
on the la~ of self-defense. Conversely, if 
all reasonable men must conclude that the 
evidence is so slight as to be incapable 
of raisinc a reasonable doubt in the jury's 
mind as t~ vhether a defendant accused of a 
crime acted in self-defense, tendered 
instructions thereon are properly refused. 
~S7 P. 2ci at 620 (e::<~hasis added). 
Respondent subffiits that such reasoning regarding the 
"reasc"1ai)le doubt" stan6ard in Castillo should be applied to the 
If so C:~e. ~here is no evidence other than 
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appellant's allegations on appeal to support his theories. 
A look at the record and the evidence as well as inferences 
contained therein reveals no reasonable basis which would 
support a conviction of manslaughter based upon appellant's 
Band C theories (Section 76-5-205(b) and (c)). 
Appellant's theory under Section 76-5-205(b) that 
he caused the death of Lynn Oliver under the influence of 
extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there is 
a reasonable explanation or excuse is strictly theory. There 
is absolutely no evidence of such in the record. On the 
contrary, testimony by eyewitnesses to the fight testified 
that appellant, j:lrior to the fight, seemed to be kidding with 
everybody (R.30l-3C2), appeared to be in a good mood (R.302, 
333, 490), was buying everybody drinks (R.301), and was 
himself drinking but vias not drurck (R.30l-302,334). The 
appellant offered testimony that he was rna~ and drunk on the 
night of November 10, 1977, but such is the only evidence 
remotely associated with any altering of appellant's 
mental state (R.529). 
Nor is there sufficiently reasonable evidence to 
support a finding of a verdict of guilty of m2nslaughter 
6 The standard cf reviev,• of this Court is to "sur\•ev the 
whole evidence and the inferences naturallv to be-deduc~ 
therefrom to see whether there is an reas;nable basis 
therein which would suooort a convic ion of the lesser 
offenses. Stat~· v. Harris, 2 Ctah 2d 365, 489 
P.2d 1008, lOll (1971). 
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pursuant to Section 76-5-205 (c), -,.,hereby appellant claims 
that he "caused the death of Lynn Oliver under circumstances 
where appellant reasonably believed the circumstances provided 
a moral or legal justification or extenuation for his conduct," 
though such conduct is not legally justifiable or excusable 
under the existing circumstances. Appellant would have this 
Court believe that Lynn Oliver's death was "just" the result 
of an old bar-room brav;l which got out of hand--"just" a 
"mutual combative fisticuffs" where the participants were 
"acting under the influence." Yet strangely enough, no one 
('>,·i th the exception of Kim Horroc'~s), and especia=.ly 
appellant, seem to "remember" anything about the fight or the 
circumstances surrounding it or ;::-:tat l·:as said, etc. (R. 488, 
4 91' 4 9 3 ' 4 96' 4 9 7' 50 0' 50 l' 50 2' 50 3 ' 50 7 ' 50 8 ' 510) . Appellant 
could not remember what was said during the fight (R.SOO), 
could not remember where he was fighting in the parking lot 
( 0 " 50:0), could not reme::-,ber 1-,chy :r.e fought 1-1ith Lynn Oliver 
(;:;, 5C7), could not r~'l'lember what caused Lynn Oliver to 
:all (R. 508), etc. In short, appellant did not remember 
many of the relevant aspects of that fatal night of November 
10,1977. 
Yet now on a~peal he is asking this Court to rule 
t~_at the trial judae should have instructed the jury to 
cr~s~~cr tis t~eories c~ ma~sla~s~ter of which he can offer 
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7 . 
no recorded evidence. Case and statutory law lS replete 
that exclusion of lesser included offense instructions as 
well as theories thereon are to be excluded where there is 
no evidence to reduce the offense to the lesser grade. 
State v. Bender, 581 P.2d 1019 (Utah 1978); State v. Bell, 
563 P.2d 187 (Utah 1977); State v. Dougherty, 550 P.2d 175 
(Utah 1976); State v. Ferguson, 279 Pac. 55 (Utah 1929). 
Pursuant to Section 77-33-6, the jury could have 
found appellant guilty of manslaughter based upon appellant's 
"A" theory (Section 76-5-205 (a)); that is, that appellant did 
recklessly cause the death of Lynn Oliver. This is assuming, 
arguendo, that the j ~ry would have found such a theory to be 
well founded evidentially, which obviously it did not do 
choosing instead to believe the evidence which supports the 
state's theory, thereby convictlng appellant of the higher 
crime of Second Degree Murder. 
Jl.ppellant cites State v. Dougherty, supra, and 
concludes that his factual situation is within the scope 
7 Utah CoLle Ann. § 77-33-6 (1953), as amencec, states: "T'1e 
jur~r rna~- find the defe:~dant cuilt\· of an\· of~ense the 
commission of v:':1ich is neces~aril;, included in that ,.,-:_tr, 
which he is charged in the ir;dict.~tent or inforr.atior., o: o: 
an atterr.pt to cor-unit the offense." 
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o::: the c;uide:!_ines set forth therein.8 He reasons that any 
reasonable theory based upon any evidence, however slight, 
upon which he could be convicted of the lesser offense 
~arrants giving of the instruction. 
Appellant does not come within the guidelines 
set forth in the first situation described in Dougherty as 
~e has not produced evidence which would absolve him from 
guilt of the second degree murder charge. The second 
situation in Dougherty is not applicable to appellant 
because having denied kicking Oliver in the head, and no~ 
The three sitautions of which the Utah Supreme Court 
spoke regarding the giving of lesser included instructions 
c.re: 
First, where there is evidence ~hich would 
atsolve the defendant from guilt of a greater 
of:::ense, or degree, but would support a finding 
of guilt of a lesser o::::ense, or degree; the 
instruction lS mandator~. 
Second, where the evidence would not support 
2. ::ir.Cir-.s; oZ quilt ir. t:--:e corrmission of the ies,;er 
o==ense or aegree. For example, the defendant 
denies anv comolicitv in the crime charced, and thus 
lavs no f~unda~ion f~r any intermediate"verdict; or 
1 
.. :~1~:::-e ~~.e elE.~en~s of t::-.e offenses differ 1 and some 
ele~ent essential to the lesser offense is either 
not proved or shown not to exist. This second situa-
tion renders an instruc=ion on a lesser included 
c:=ense erro~eous, beca~se it is not pertinent. 
Tr.i::d, is an in~er.-·.ediate situation. One where 
~i~e ele;-:-,ents of the area-cer offense include all the 
c=:_~:-lf2:-.ts cf ~~h1e less..,er cffe::se; because, by its very 
~2~~::e, ~~E ~~eater c::::e~se co~ld not have been 
co~~~tted ~:,~~1out d~fE~~ant ~a\·inc the intent in co~nq ~~~ ~~~s. which co~s~itu~e ~~e lesser offense. 
::;:::;-; ::::·0c .. c. si::~..c:..ticn i~s-=-ruc-c.ions on the lesser included 
c=-=:=::1.se ~.2~- ; ___ ::: gi\·en, beca:-.2se all elewents of the lesser 
o~~c~sc l1a··e bee~ oro\·ed. Howe~rer, such an instruction 
:cc:c:cLc·· :je refused i:" the prosecution has met its 
~~:_::_·,.=:\:_':--_ =~ :_,_:··=-<,: o:--. t_~--.--= :-:-ec.-c.er OtfeJ'.se, and there is 
--=--~J:_·_'"~~ ~, ----:0.~:-:.c~ ":c ::e:=: __ lce the qreater offense. 
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knowing how or why the victim died, if he was believed by 
the jury, he would be guilty of criminal negligence at the 
most, probably guilty of nothing at all. This is so because 
if the jury believed the appellant's version of the details of 
the fight (of which he remembers very little), then Kim Horrocr.,\ 
the only living eyewitness to the kicking inc~dent other than 
appellant, would have to be disbelieved by the jury. Thus a 
death occurs, but no one can explain how it occurred, if 
Ms. Horrocks is not believed and appellant believed. The 
third situation does not give credence to appellant's conten-
tion, as the prosecution met its burden of proof on the great~\ 
offense. 9 
Finally, in support of the view that the prosecut~n 
met its burden of proof on the greater offense, once Lynn 
Oliver was on the ground, the "mutual combativeness" ended 
the moment appellant used his boot to kick Lynn Oliver in t'le 
head. At that moment, appellant brought hi~ actions and 
demonstrated the intent necessary to propel his actions into 
the category of Second Degree ~1urder. 
Respondent thus respectfully submits that the trial 
judge was within his discretion in refusing to give the 
appellant's B and C theories regarding manslaLghter. 
9 See also Section 76-1-402 (4), '<ir,ich stateE: 
not be obliaated to charge the jury with r 
included offense unless there is a rationa 
verdict acquitting the defendant of the of 
convicting him of the lEcluCed offense. !I 
Tr,e couc:t =~,a .. 
~;::-ect to an 
bccsis for a 
ensc charced 
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c!-,ose not to co:-cvict appellant on the theory of manslaughter 
that was offered. Certainly it has not and cannot be now 
shown that the giving of the instruction on appellant's B 
and C ~anslaughter theories would have produced a different 
result in the trial. State v. Bell, supra. 
court's ruling should therefore be upheld. 
The trial 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY Il\STRUCTED THE 
JURY REGhRDING CREDIBILITY OF THE WITNESSES 
Ac'lu THE WEIGHT TO BE GIVEN THEIR TESTIMONY. 
Appellant alleges that the trial judge, in Co~~~ s 
Instruction 3 (R.l46), failed to instruct the jury that a 
witness's testimony may be impeached and the credibility of 
~~e ~itness thus affected by ''. . his character for honesty 
or veracity or their opposites." His reasoning is that the 
effect of such an alleged omission left the jury with no 
~~a~tard to deter~ine the purpose or weight of such evidence. 
~espo~de~t SJb~its that tje instruction which the 
~rial court gave (R.l46), covers the material points raised 
by appellant affecting credibility. The instruction given 
~he court is a:-c o~:-c1bus instruction regarding credibility 
~l~~ez~es a~6 t~E we~sht to be accorded their testimony. 
cv2 5~.c:.e ·:. '3allev_·, 532 P. 2d 407, 411 (l·lontana 1975). 
:r:~. a rece:-ct case, State "''· \·:alker, 24 \·iash.App. 78, 599 
( l_C-;- 9) ' :.~e dcfe~da~~-appellant alleged that the 
~'-- •. (_ (' -:..._-' (__:; .=._ ,_ l l l : . ~he Court of Appeals 
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of washington sustained the ruling of the trial judge, 
holding that the standard instruction on weight and 
credibility to be given the witness was sufficient. 
The instruction given by the trial court in the 
present case sufficiently instructed the jurors as to how 
they were to judge witness credibility: 
(R.l46). 
. You may . . consider 
in accordance with your honest convictions. 
what weight and credibility you should give 
to the testimony of each witness, measured 
by reason and common sense and the rules 
set forth in these instructions. 
It is to be noted that appellant's concern regarding 
the testimony of John Watson concerning Kim Horrocks' repu~-
tion in the comnmni ty for truth and veracity is not well 
founded, since Watson was not allowed to testify regarding 
such (see Point IV, infra). 
There was tl:'.erefore, no error comr:1itted by the 
trial judse regarding giving of the instructions or 
credibility of witnesses. 
POV<T IV 
THE TRIAL COURT DID ::OT ERR HJ REoUSit<G TO 
.;',LLOW DEFE::s:c 1\-IT:;;::ss JO:C:!; l'i'ATSO~! TO GIV:C 
HIS OPINIOF REG_=-.RDil\G ':'HE CHJ'.RL,CTE:" OF 
KI!1 HORROCKS FOR TRCT" OR \'E:fu'",CITY. 
Appellant offered the testimony of John \'Iatson 
regarding Ms. Horrocks' character for purposes of inpeachinc 
her testimony. The Cou~t refused to allo~ sue~~ tE·~~imon~-
-46-
• 
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cue to a lack of proper foundation. The colloquy in question 
occurred as ~allows: 
Q. Have you had occasion to discuss with 
people or to her about discussions 
concerning Kin Horrocks' reputation for 
truthfulness in the community of Lark? 
A. (lvatson): \vhat was that? 
Q. Have you had discussions with people in 
Lark or heard discussions with people in 
Lark about Kim Horrock's reputation for 
truth? 
A. Talk had over her, no. 
Q. Whether or not she is a truthful person? 
A. No. 
* * * (Colloquy between the court and coc.n:;el, 
The \Vitness. (\·Iatson): I have never beer-. 
asked about it, you know, never ~o 
discussion about it. 
Underhill's Criminal Evidence (Fifth Ed. 1956), at 
Section 195 states the mode of proving the general reputation 
~:~~c~ ~he accused possesses: 
. . . general reputation which the 
accused possesses and e~jo~·s a~ong his 
ac~~~i~tances, ~~-.- be sio;~n b~r the 
testi:-:',c:o:-:::· o:' sue:-,- persc:1s only. The l,·itness 
is :::..c1 t cc:':l;:e::e:--~::. u:-:.less it is first sho\·.~ 
t~2~ ~e k~O\·:s s~ch rep~ta~ion, which must 
be =~at ~~ic~ is curre:-:t in the neighborhood 
·,,'hEre he and t:-,e accused reside. If 1vi tness 
doEs not know ~here accused lived, he is 
inco~petent. T~1e ~itness cannot give an 
ooinion which is merelv the result of observing 
t~e disoosition and co;duct of the defendant. 
Khat is-recuired of hi~ is his knowledge 
of ~~e exis~lnc oeneral reoutation which he has 
o:J~ai:-,ec b\· "'"'~r~:-<c L>e co~'Tlents of others on the 
accu:=ec 1:hi:Ce :-,e l~ved a.":lonc those w·ho knew him, 
ar.d :.ct :.is o·,;n exclc.sl·,;e personal kno1vledge. The 
~ual~~lC2tion of character witnesses is largely 
~i::~~~ ::~e ~~~cre::io~ c~ the trial court. 
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It is apparent that Watson was not competent as 
a witness to testify regarding Ms. Horrock's reputation for 
truth or veracity in the community of Lark as he had not 
talked with people in the same community in which she 
lived concerning her reputation; thus he had no way of knowi~ . 
what her reputation consisted of. 
The trial court made the proper ruling regarding 
the testimony; thus, it should not be interfered with by 
this Court. 
CONCLUSION 
The jury returned a verdict of guilty of Murder in 
the Second Degree. That verdict should not be interfered wi~ 
unless there is evidence of prejudice which has occurred in 
a substantial manner. State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d 1338; rehearinq 
Cienied State v. Andre\·:s, 5-;'6 F. 2C. SS/ (Utah 1977). Appellant 
has alleged several errors in the proceedings regarding 
evidentiary ~atters and instructions. Respondent submits 
that no error 11c.s been shown by appellant, or in the 
alternative that any such error does not raise a reasonable 
probability or likelihood that there would have been a 
result more favorable to ap?ellant. Respondent, therefore, 
urges affirmc.tion of the judgment of the trial court. 
he"pect:':ully sebrr:i tted, 
P03ERT B. H-~~l~SE~\ 
~t~orney General 
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